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Sustainability Fellowships: The Potential for Collective Stakeholder Influence

Abstract
Purpose –Given the current ecological state of the planet organizations now need to
develop their sustainability to a significantly greater extent and at a faster pace. This
paper proposes stakeholder collectives as a means for rapid and comprehensive
sustainability, while also examining the moderating influence of firm size and change
potential.
Design/methodology/approach – A theoretical analysis leads to the development of
multiple propositions. The work concentrates on one research question: How can we
bring about rapid and comprehensive organizational sustainability?
Findings – Arguments for the inability of individual stakeholders to drive the level
of sustainability now required are presented. Propositions suggesting that
sustainability can be obtained through stakeholder collectives, moderated by firm
size and the change potential of the firm are developed.
Research limitations/implications – Research using stakeholder theory has
examined intra-stakeholder group collective action, but arguably the more important,
inter-stakeholder group collective action, has received little attention. We elaborate
the prospects for collective stakeholder influence strategies as useful for increasing
sustainability.
Social implications – Stakeholders seeking to further sustainability can unite around
a common purpose to further increase their power, legitimacy and urgency. They
might also specifically target organizations of a larger size and with rapid change
potential, and lastly, encourage anonymity.
Originality/value – The main contribution is the nexus between stakeholder
influence strategies and the collective goal of sustainability. By examining an
underdeveloped component of stakeholder theory we answer the question how
stakeholders can drive the extensive and rapid organizational sustainability now
required.
Keywords - Sustainability, stakeholder theory, collective stakeholder influence,
change potential, anonymity, legacy
Paper type –Conceptual paper
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Introduction
In their landmark book—The Limits to Growth—Meadows, Meadows, Randers and
Behrens (1972) used computer simulations to demonstrate that in a finite system there are limits
to growth. While ostensibly obvious, our propensity to pursue growth regardless of the
externalities demonstrates our belief in growth without limits. Indeed, our economic models
predicated on continuous growth are inherently unsustainable. Despite many indicators of
resource depletion and pending collapse (Garcia and Cochrane, 2011; Makower, 2009), and
thousands of scientists and politicians stressing the need for action (e.g., Gore, 2006; 2009;
Pacala and Socolow, 2004), in general, consumers have not met the challenge, governments have
not done enough, and corporations have not changed to keep pace with the damage that is
accumulating.
Within the managerial discourse, sustainability has become a major theme (Russo and
Fouts, 1997; Svensson and Wagner, 2011; 2012), and most managers say they would like to or
intend to maintain or increase their sustainability budgets (Aberdeen, 2009). Good news
considering the increasing number of worrisome environmental queues including global
warming, declining fish stocks, unprecedented species extinctions, frequent super-storms, and
resource wars (Garcia and Cochrane, 2011; Makower, 2009; Meadows, Randers and Meadows,
2004). The very engines of economic growth, the corporations, that helped create the modern
standard of living we have come to know, appear to be destroying their own resource base faster
than it can naturally or artificially be recovered with environmental innovations. Besides,
environmental innovations may only save those who can afford them. In short, a case can be
made that a change of course may not only be desirable but necessary (Laszlo, 2003).
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In many ways, the cloak of anonymity provided by profit-maximizing firms is similar to
Plato's Ring of Gyges, as more recently depicted in the Lord of the Rings trilogy (Tolkien, 195455). Over time, and depending on the particular individual, the ring corrupts its bearer regardless
of one’s initial intentions, leading the wise to avoid wearing it (e.g., Gandalf and Galadriel). Just
as the Ring gave its bearer tremendous power and strength, so too has our almost blind pursuit of
growth. In the books and movies, the fellowship of the ring is formed to destroy the ring and
uncloak its wearers. Similarly, in our path toward true organizational sustainability, perhaps we
need to form a fellowship to confront our pursuit of growth regardless of the externalities. In the
Lord of the Rings, the fellowship consisted of a mixed variety of individuals. Our fellowship will
require a mixed variety of stakeholders, all in pursuit of the same purpose: sustainability
(Svensson and Wagner, 2012).
In this conceptual paper we discuss the ability of key stakeholders as possible driving
forces of sustainability in organizations. In addition, we develop propositions for the influence of
firm size and stakeholder anonymity on organizational sustainability. We conclude that
individual stakeholders and/or environmental innovations on their own will not be enough to
drive organizational sustainability to a level that is now required, given the current state of the
natural environment. Our main research question is how can we bring about rapid and
comprehensive organizational sustainability? We find our answer using stakeholder theory and
insights into collective stakeholder action.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on sustainability.
Second, we discuss a number of possible stakeholders as potential driving forces to achieving
sustainability, but conclude that each on its own is insufficient. Third, we review stakeholder
theory and a promising avenue that has been identified for future research: inter-stakeholder
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group collective action (Laplume, Songpar, and Litz, 2008). We elaborate the prospects for
individual stakeholder group influence and then describe how collective stakeholder influence
strategies may be useful for increasing sustainability. Fourth, in our theory development section
we offer a number of moderating propositions about the influence of firm size, vertical
integration, and change potential. Finally, we discuss our study’s implications including a
discussion of the mechanisms of anonymity and legacy as potential areas of interest to future
researchers. We discuss the potential for empirical tests of our propositions, and potential hurdles
in the path toward sustainability-driven collective stakeholder influence strategies.
The drive for sustainability
Sustainable development is commonly defined as “development that meets the needs of
today’s generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs” (Our Common Future, 1987). The closely related term sustainability refers to “the longterm maintenance of systems according to environmental, economic and social considerations”
(Crane and Matten, 2010: 34). Business sustainability represents a new business model where
economic, environmental and social issues are considered simultaneously in a balanced and
holistic manner. Previously viewed as disparate concepts (Friedman, 1970), today, an increasing
number of business-minded people have come to believe in a triple-bottom-line approach (Savitz
and Weber, 2006).
Environmental sustainability, the focus of this paper, is an integrated concept that is
linked to, but different from, both social sustainability and economic sustainability. For instance,
social sustainability is about equality, rights, and preservation of culture; economic sustainability
is concerned with conservation for the sake of production; and environmental sustainability is
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about maintaining natural capital (Goodland, 1995; Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, 2010; Vogel,
2005).
Firms may seek environmental sustainability for a variety of reasons including: the
potential and realization of positive financial consequences (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky,
Schmidt and Rynes, 2003), managerial cognitions including interpretations of environmental
issues as potential opportunities as opposed to threats (Ghobadian, Viney, James and Liu, 1995;
Lee and Rhee, 2007; Sharma, 2000), motivations and contextual factors (Bansal and Roth, 2000),
stakeholder pressures (Buysse and Verbeke, 2003; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999; GonzalezBonito and Gonzalez-Bonito, 2006), organizational champions pushing for a more proactive
environmental approach (Andersson and Bateman, 2000), and as a way to adapt to regulations
(Marcus and Geffen, 1998; Majumdar and Marcus, 2001).
One of the first and perhaps the most frequently referenced typology of environmental
strategies can be found in Carroll’s (1979) foundational piece on corporate social responsibility.
One of the paper’s main contributions was to separate companies based on four levels of
responsibility ordered in what Carroll calls: “their fundamental role in the evolution of
importance” (1979: 500). These responsibilities were: economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary.
In his development of the levels of responsibility Carroll used earlier work by Wilson (1975),
whose environmental categories are still frequently used today and include a reactive, defensive,
accommodative, and proactive approach.
A more recent and commonly used typology was proposed by Hart (1995). According to
Hart, firms can do much more than prevent pollution; they can also become product stewards and
enable sustainable development. While pollution prevention involves mitigating waste in process
technologies, product stewardship involves taking ownership of product waste from the cradle to
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the grave, or through the product life-cycle. Sustainable development involves the development
of environmentally friendly technologies and may involve taking an active role to ensure that
suppliers also follow environmental best practices. Our research question asks how can we bring
about rapid and comprehensive organizational (environmental) sustainability?
The potential of stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory suggests that stakeholder groups, including customers, the media,
government and even employees often lack the ability to mobilize as collectives. For instance,
they may not identify with the firm enough to care to change it or they may have such divergent
interests that in-fighting prevents collective action (Scott and Lane, 2000). Members of a
stakeholder group often have heterogeneous interests, making it difficult to agree on priorities
and collective action (Wolfe and Putler, 2002). Mobilizing for collective action may be harder
when there is considerable variability between individual attitudes, whether between or within
stakeholder groups (Cordano, Frieze and Ellis, 2004; Winn, 2001). What follows is a set of
arguments suggesting how a number of stakeholder groups acting individually cannot bring
about organizational sustainability to the extent and with the speed that is now required (Gore,
2009; Pacala and Socolow, 2004).
Consumers driving sustainability
One approach that is often touted as a way to move corporations to sustainable
environmental levels is for customers to vote for sustainable companies with their purchases
(Sandhu, Ozanne, Smallman, and Cullen, 2010). If a company offers a polluting product, or a
product that pollutes heavily on its way from development to production to the eventual
consumer, customers need simply decide not to purchase from this company, thereby forcing the
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firm to become more sustainable or suffer lost sales. Accordingly, only sustainable companies
would survive and thrive. However, there are three main problems with this argument.
First, consumers have cognitive limitations including bounded rationality and satisficing
(Simon, 1955), and resource constraints that prevent them from supporting sustainable firms.
Unfortunately, green consumerism may be too heavy a burden of responsibility for the majority
of individuals to bear (Moisander, 2007; Niva and Timonen, 2001). Consumer intentions to buy
sustainably produced products are often not reflected in their actions (Pearce and Turner, 1990).
Having low expectations of consumers is suggested by the weak response to a five-year
campaign to combat air pollution (Hutton and Ahtola, 1991), the public’s poor understanding of
global warming and other environmental issues (Gore, 2006; 2009; Kempton 1991), the slow
change in garbage disposal patterns of consumers (Pieters, 1991), and limited consumer
preferences for environmental quality and social goals (Uusitalo, 1990; Young, Hwang,
McDonald, and Oates, 2010). Consumers have to be willing to invest considerable time and
effort to research all their purchases to know if the product or service is produced sustainably.
Many consumers may not read labels, and may be unable to make sense of the flurry of
available information. They may be unable to critically evaluate what is green-washing and what
is not (Walker and Wan, 2012). For example, in 2010 the environmental marketing agency
Terrachoice found a 73 percent increase from the year before in the number of products making
green claims, and 95 percent of products examined contained at least one green-wash claim
(CBC news, Oct 26, 2010). So even if consumers had no cognitive limitations preventing them
from shopping sustainably, many of their rational decisions would be based on false claims.
Skeptical consumers who do not believe corporate messages related to sustainability may divert

8	
  
	
  

	
  

Sustainability Fellowships	
  

their attention to more traditional dimensions such as product performance, quality, price, and
convenience (Essoussi and Linton, 2010).
Second, sustainably produced products and services often cost more, especially in the
short run (e.g., Ahmad, Yasin, Derek, and Lim, 2011). Additional costs can be incurred for a
number of reasons including: switching to environmentally friendly materials or machinery, time
and effort to develop the new sustainable product or service, self-imposed environmental
standards above those that may have existed previously (particularly in developing countries),
and communicating the new product or service to employees, the public and the media.
However, such additional costs can certainly change over time as increased efficiencies at the
corporate level result in savings that are ultimately passed down to consumers, and as
environmentally friendly products increase in popularity so they too can benefit from economies
of scale and scope. Nevertheless, some problems may not improve with scale. For instance,
renewable energy has yet to be price competitive with non-renewable sources of energy like coal
and oil. Paying more for sustainable products is simply not possible for many people, and others
are simply unwilling to pay the additional expense (Essoussi and Linton, 2010).
Third, customers rarely organize to influence firms. Indeed, it may be inaccurate to think
of consumers or non-institutional customers as a stakeholder group at all; unless they organize,
they have no stake. Consumer groups and protection agencies aside, there are few product level
customer organizations, and while there may be occasional internet protests, customers are rarely
organized to influence firms. For instance, Koko (2012) found that consumer boycotts launched
by individuals via the internet are not an effective tool to render economic harm on firms. This
may be because firms have learned to combat potential and actual boycotts using various
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strategies including the dissemination of unrelated positive information (Yuksel and Mryteza,
2009).
In sum, with bounded rationality, satisficing, a plethora of confusing green advertising,
an unwillingness or inability to pay higher prices, and a tendency not to organize to influence
firms, consumers are an unreliable source of influence over corporate sustainability through their
buying behavior alone. Consumer pressure alone is simply not enough to drive firms to
comprehensive and rapid sustainability.
Media driving sustainability
Another argument is that the media can drive corporations to environmentally sustainable
levels. This occurs because companies want to avoid any bad publicity or damage to their
reputations (Deephouse, 2000; Walker, 2010), which will ultimately hurt their ability to sell their
products or services (Trudel and Cotte, 2009). Indeed, the media can bring urgency to an issue
and become a force for change. For example, even the relatively new social media has had a
profound effect on the Middle East dispelling despots and giving power back to the people. Yet
the media’s ability to influence corporations is limited for a number of reasons.
First, just like consumers, the media is not 100 percent rational or perfectly informed.
The media frequently misreports. Indeed, sometimes they intentionally do so as their goal is to
sell newspapers or magazines, and controversy, even faux controversy, helps them to do so.
Second, corporations, who have greater access and detailed information about themselves than
the media, often dispute media reports making it difficult to decipher which side is telling the
truth. Finally, the power of the media is often overstated. That is, not everyone will be aware,
believe, or care what the media is reporting. Thus, while the media can bring urgency to an issue,
they are hardly reliable drivers of sustainability.
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Government driving sustainability
According to U.S. public opinion polls for a number of years now the “public views
business and industry as the major contributors to environmental problems” and believes that
“business and industry will not voluntarily protect the environment” (Dunlap and Scarce, 1991:
655). As a result, legal scholars and accountants have proposed regulation as a way to rein in
firms (e.g., Hughes, Anderson and Golden, 2001).
Unlike any other stakeholder, governments have the ability and power to set
environmental limits and standards, and most importantly, enforce them. For example, if
governments stated that all companies had to obtain a certain level of carbon emissions by 2020
or face substantial fines and potential closure, all would have to comply to remain competitive
and viable. A government’s ability to enforce compliance through penalties, fines, and clean-up
costs (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996) affords them great power
(Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997). The problem is that governments are often unwilling or unable
to implement such drastic changes. Similar to the media, governments are not as powerful as
people often assume.
Corporations influence governments primarily through political donations and lobbying.
Corporate political activities are attempts to change government policy in favor of the firm.
Hillman, Keim, and Schuler (2004: 838) wrote “it is indisputable that business firms spend
considerable money and are among the most prominent political players not only in Washington,
DC but in capitals across the globe”. Indeed, a recent cover story in Time magazine (September
23, 2013) titled “How Wall Street won: Five years after the crash, it could happen all over
again”, discusses how financial lobbyists successfully repealed regulations that were meant to
avoid another global financial crises.
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In addition, governments have repeatedly demonstrated that they are unwilling to make
environmental changes that might damage their economy. For example, Canada is projected to
fail to meet its Kyoto air emission targets primarily due to the continued and growing exploration
of the Alberta oil sands. Despite the visible, dramatic, and costly environmental consequences of
the oil sands, the government continues to invest millions into it because of the substantial
economic benefits. Thus governments often lack the incentive to implement drastic or even
modest environmental changes. By the very nature of their positions, government officials more
often than not make relatively short-term decisions that keep them elected, and voters,
confronted with current needs, often vote in favor of jobs and economic growth over
environmental sustainability. This leads us to conclude that government alone cannot drive firms
to comprehensive and rapid sustainability.
Other stakeholders driving sustainability
Employees can be a force for environmental change within organizations (Andersson and
Bateman, 2000), and proactive environmental approaches can lead to better attraction and
retention of employees (Darnall, Henriques and Sadorsky, 2010; Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999).
However, employee groups and their unions usually form to gain higher wages or better working
conditions rather than achieving sustainability. This was evident in the Canadian cod fisheries
where fishermen lobbied the government to continue to over exploit the fish thereby ensuring the
extinction of their own jobs. The unfortunate reality is that employees often pursue jobs at the
cost of the natural environment.
Although it has been argued that corporations ignore environmental activists at their own
peril (Hendry, 2006), in general, such groups tend to be too fragmented and lack the legitimacy
needed to cause meaningful and rapid corporate change. Finally, suppliers with dominant
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positions can influence sustainability by endeavoring to supply sustainable substitutes (Darnall et
al., 2010), but very few suppliers are in such powerful positions or have the resources necessary
to offer sustainable substitutes. In addition, despite some sustainability-minded suppliers, in
today’s global market there always appear to be suppliers willing to buy cheaper and
environmentally damaging goods (evident across the globe but especially apparent in developing
countries). Lastly, suppliers risk losing sales if they try to press their customers for non-price
concessions, or if they are forced to pass on costs for more expensive goods to consumers.
To destroy the ring of power the fellowship needed Gimli’s axe (the dwarf), Legolas’
bow (the elf), Aragorn’s sword (one of two men), Gandalf’s staff (the wizard) and Frodo’s
determination (one of four hobbits). Similarly, to usher in a new order of sustainable corporate
practices we believe the various stakeholders with their assortment of “weapons” and
characteristics are required. In particular, to obtain the necessary power, legitimacy and urgency
to enact rapid corporate change (Mitchel, Agle and Wood, 1997), stakeholders must form a
fellowship.
Technology driving sustainability
In the preceding sections we argued that the stakeholders we discussed (consumers, the
media, government, employees, environmental activists and suppliers) could not on their own
enact the rapid and extensive sustainability required today. A further argument we have not
considered until this point is that technology will ultimately push organizations to sustainability.
This is a common argument from people who want to maintain the current status quo. They
believe that we can continue business as usual and when change is absolutely necessary
technology will easily guide us to greater sustainability. For example, “the sun pours 10,000
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times more energy upon the earth every day than human beings currently use,” (Meadows et al.,
2004: 97), so solar technology will emerge when needed.
The fundamental flaw to this argument is that while technology can and does change
rapidly, in contrast, political and social institutions take years if not decades or more to change
(Meadows et al., 2004). In addition, they almost never change proactively but only retroactively
in response to a need (Meadows et al., 2004). Furthermore, technology is not dispersed evenly
across demographics. For example, many individuals and countries might not have the capital
required to construct the infrastructure necessary to support new technologies. Lastly, the idea
that something such as solar technology will be developed to save us before it is too late fails to
consider the powerful and vested oil and coal interests that might prevent such technology from
being available and used on a wide basis. This is not to say that something like solar technology
might not win out in the end, only that the ability of such technology to bring about sustainability
within a timely manner is limited. Arguably, all of the technologies we need to achieve
sustainability are already invented and fairly easily available. In general, however, they are more
expensive to use and therefore ignored in favor of other cheaper solutions, highlighting that it is
the choice of stakeholders to use technology that really counts.
In the next section we elaborate on stakeholder theory and contribute to it by discussing
inter-stakeholder group collective action.
Theory development
Stakeholder theory research suggests a strong role for stakeholder groups in influencing
the management of business firms (Freeman, 1984). Much of the stakeholder literature has been
dominated by the point of view of the manager rather than that of stakeholders because it was
originally developed as a strategic approach aimed at increasing firm performance objectives
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(Laplume et al., 2008). Empirical studies examining the relationship between stakeholder
management and firm financial performance have largely found positive associations (e.g.,
Hillman and Keim, 2001; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Berman,
Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999). Another important theme is research devoted to understanding,
explaining and predicting how organizations can manage stakeholders. For instance, Freeman
(1984) suggested four stakeholder management strategies: exploit, defend, swing, or reinforce.
This focus on how managers can use stakeholders to their own advantage has left some
scholars wondering where concern for the natural environment and society fits in stakeholder
theory. For instance, Matten and Crane (2005) argue that firms have semi-governmental roles
and thus are responsible for ensuring basic human rights and civil liberties, just as good
governments do – a prescription that goes far beyond Freeman’s original intentions. The
Stanford Research Institute has argued that multination corporations with economic powers on
par with nations should “assume responsibility for the welfare of those over whom they wield
power” (1982: 58). Orts and Strudler (2002: 215) argue that stakeholder theory “is limited by its
focus on the interests of human participants in the business enterprise.” Natural resources are not
able to stake their claims in decisions of corporate managers. In short, many stakeholders without
power over the firm have been ignored.
In response, some scholars have argued that the natural environment, like forests and
other ecosystems, be included in managerial stakeholder analysis (Driscoll and Starik, 2004;
Starik, 1995). After all, nature is legitimate, urgent and powerful (Mitchel, Agle, and Wood,
1997). Accordingly, a relatively new strand of stakeholder theory has evolved which takes the
perspective of stakeholders rather than that of the firm. Jensen argued that “stakeholder theory
plays into the hands of special interests who wish to use the resources of firms for their own
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ends” (2002: 242). Yet, there is an increasing chorus of management research into the potential
for stakeholder influence strategies (Frooman, 1999). This theme in stakeholder theory turns
Freeman’s original thesis over on its head and theorizes and tests how stakeholders influence
firms (Laplume et al., 2008).
Despite the lack of continual immediate common financial concern, stakeholder groups
have in some instances formed around common goals, visions and indirect economic interests.
For instance, common threats can motivate stakeholder groups to come together and collaborate
(Butterfield et al., 2004). Stakeholder groups are more likely to act together if they perceive that
their target organizations will respond to their influences. To form effective groups, stakeholders
must believe in the force of the group to enact change. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) suggest
stakeholder groups are more likely to act collectively if they have acted collectively in the past,
share communication networks, and when a common identity is conferred through association
with the collectivity. In short, there has been much research examining how potential members
of stakeholder groups can unite.
What is missing from this perspective is an analysis of how stakeholder groups can form
strategic alliances to influence firms (Butterfield, Reed, and Lemak, 2004). Strategic alliances
have been suggested as mechanisms that can foster the exchange of valuable resources that are
otherwise difficult to acquire (Lorange, Roos, and Brønn, 1992). Yet, these valuable tools have
yet to be enacted in the context of alliances between stakeholder groups with the intentions of
driving firm sustainability. This is much different from research examining the use of strategic
alliances by firms (e.g., Kotabe and Swan, 1995) with the intention of becoming proactively
sustainable. So that collective stakeholder action would be needed or desirable, we might assume
that the firm is not voluntarily enacting sustainability strategies, at least to the extent desired by
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the stakeholders. In contrast, firms that are already on the path to sustainability on their own are
not likely to be targeted; usually the worst polluters become targets of stakeholder activities
(Hendry, 2006; Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Brammer and Millington, 2008).
As we argued in the previous section, individual stakeholder groups are limited in their
ability to drive the kind of quick and drastic sustainability now needed. Even if two or more
stakeholder groups happen to target the same firm, they may fail to coordinate their influence on
the same issue. Rather than competing for the attention of the firm, they might more effectively
coordinate together. While powerful stakeholders may use direct strategies, other stakeholders
without power over the firm may use indirect strategies, such as working through an ally (e.g.,
the media). Stakeholders with little to lose from drawing the firm’s ire might simultaneously
withhold resources or make use of firm resources conditional (Frooman, 1999). Indeed,
stakeholder groups used both strategies to influence the environmental practices of Canadian
forestry companies (Sharma and Henriques, 2005). Stakeholders may also seek to become more
permanent fixtures in decision-making institutions (O’Connell, Stephens, Betz, Shepard and
Hendry, 2005). Stakeholder influence is determined not only by the power, legitimacy, and
urgency of the stakeholder group (Eesley and Lenox, 2006; Mitchel, Agle andWood, 1997;
Welcomer, 2002), but by the collective force of stakeholder groups working together. Coalitions
of stakeholder groups may allow ostensibly disparate groups to combine their resources in
innovative ways that increase their combined bargaining position with firms (Kochan and
Rubenstein, 2000; Neville and Menguc, 2006; Scott and Lane, 2000). Stakeholders may use all
of the cognitive, normative, legal, and other institutional mechanisms available to influence
corporations (Suchman, 1995).
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Research has found a positive relationship between stakeholder pressures and increased
levels of sustainability (Darnall et al., 2010). We suggest that these pressures can be further
strengthened when a coalition or fellowship of like-minded stakeholders is formed. As opposed
to functional stakeholder groups, collective stakeholder groups are more likely to obtain the
necessary legitimacy, power and urgency to drive organizational sustainability to the required
level. This leads us to the proposition that ceteris paribus:
Proposition 1: Collective stakeholder influence strategies will drive
organizational sustainability more effectively than individual stakeholder
influence strategies.
Hunting for elephants: Firm size as moderator of collective stakeholder influence
Firm size may moderate the relationship between collective stakeholder pressures and
sustainability, where stakeholder collectives are more likely to influence larger firms compared
to smaller ones. Larger firms pollute more, yet are more likely than smaller firms to integrate
environmental practices into their organizations (Chen, Lai and Wen, 2006; Etzion, 2007; LopezGamero, Claver-Cortes and Molina-Azorin, 2008; Moore, 2001; Russo and Fouts, 1997). In a
review of 10 studies examining the natural environment and controlling for size, Bowen (2000)
found that nine of them had a significant correlation between firm size and sustainability. This
occurred because larger firms are under increased scrutiny from stakeholders as their
environmental impacts, particularly their negative environmental impacts, are likely to be large
and visible (Adams and Hardwick, 1998; Brammer and Millington, 2008; Deephouse, 2000;
Hendry, 2006). Larger firms are also more likely to be proactive in an attempt to appease the
increased demands from stakeholders and to avoid or pre-empt negative consequences (Brammer
and Millington, 2008).
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These insights suggest that despite the greater resources available to large firms,
stakeholder collectives may be more effective when their actions target larger firms. More
formally, we can express this proposition as a moderation effect.
Proposition 2: Firm size will moderate the relationship between collective stakeholder
influence and sustainability; this relationship will be stronger the larger the size of the
firm.
Firm change potential as a moderator of collective stakeholder influence
Stakeholder collectives are likely to be more effective when they target firms that are able
to change quickly. The pace of change that can be expected from firms is influenced by internal
structural dynamics (e.g., vertical integration), and by external dynamics (i.e., the industry of
which they are a part). Different industries have varying economic cycles, product life cycles,
and clock-speeds (Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2007). Fast cycle industries such as computers may
experience two to three year cycles, whereas for the slow cycle industries such as
pharmaceuticals, it may be eight to ten year cycles. Importantly, face cycle industries may
already have developed the dynamic capabilities needed to rapidly adopt and develop sustainable
business practices, whereas slow cycle industries may not (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).
This relates to the broader conceptualization of a firms change potential. Large
bureaucratic organizations are generally slow to change, but a more refined inspection of the
technology within the organization might be more applicable. In particular, a firm’s change
potential is likely to be affected by its vertical architecture. Vertically integrated firms tend to be
more centralized and more able to carry out sweeping changes in technology (Ulrich, 1995). In
contrast, horizontally stratified firms are better at improving individual components, whereas
they struggle to cope with radical change that span the whole value chain (Christensen and
Verlinden, 2002; Dosi, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990), such as might be required to achieve
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cradle-to-grave product life cycles (Braungart, McDonough and Bollinger, 2007). Incumbents
with high-performing technology, good technology reputations and the ability to mobilize their
RandD resources, therefore, have a higher change potential and thus represent better targets for
collective stakeholder influence strategies than firms that are in horizontal stratifications. The
latter are less likely to move in a systematic way toward sustainability because of legal divisions,
interests and agency problems (Christensen and Verlinden, 2002). Together

these

insights

suggest that.
Proposition 3a: Fast-cycle industries will moderate the relationship between collective
stakeholder influence and sustainability; such that the faster the industry cycle, the
stronger will be the positive association.
Proposition 3b: Vertical integration will moderate the relationship between collective
stakeholder influence and sustainability; such that the more vertically integrated the firm,
the stronger will be the positive association.
Discussion
In this section we discuss (1) the implications of our paper for business ethics, (2)
stakeholder anonymity, (3) stakeholder legacy, and (4) future research.
Implications for business ethics
The more optimistic (or naïve) of us might believe that organizations can be driven to
Hart’s (1995) sustainable development environmental strategy through a moralistic appeal. Much
like we have argued that individual stakeholder groups on their own are not enough to drive
sustainability, we believe that a moralistic appeal on its own is not enough. Without an
instrumental argument, the mass appeal of sustainability to the level that is required to resolve
the truly global problem of environmental degradation is not likely. In addition, given our time
constraints and need to act quickly on the environmental front, an ethical appeal alone will not
lead to organizational sustainability in a timely manner particularly in a global context where
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shirking always exists somewhere. That said, there are certainly cases of individual stakeholder
groups, and in particular environmentally-minded owners, driving sustainability within their
companies (e.g., Ray Anderson of Interface, Anita Roddick of The Body Shop, Yvon Chouinard
of Patagonia), but on a broad basis there is very little evidence that people running organizations
will make an ethical decision over a profitable one. In fact, in their interviews of Harvard MBA
graduates Badaracco and Webb (1995) found the opposite, where managers felt pressure to
“make the numbers” regardless of ethics, as long as they were behaving within the law. Does this
then mean that there is no place for ethics in driving organizational sustainability? We believe
ethics still has an important role to play in driving organizational sustainability, but much like
individual stakeholders, ethics on its own is not sufficient.
If ethics can be combined with more direct organizational consequences, and in
particular, financial consequences, its power to drive organizational sustainability will increase
dramatically. For example, research suggests that corporate social responsibility can improve
reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Lee, Fairhurst and Wesley, 2009; Obermiller, Burke,
Talbott and Green, 2009). Given reputation’s affect on firm profitability and performance
(Brown and Perry, 1994; Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Roberts and Dowling,
2002; Walker, 2010), firms may be more willing to engage in corporate social and environmental
responsibility given the perceived impact on the bottom-line.
Similarly, given that the financial benefits to sustainability are not conclusive (Margolis
and Walsh, 2003), perceived financial benefits to sustainability are not enough on their own to
increase organizational sustainability to the level now required. Thus moral or instrumental
arguments for sustainability on their own are necessary but not sufficient, but together perhaps
they might be enough. That is, while we have argued for sustainability fellowships, we may also
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need ‘motivation fellowships’ where multiple motivations are combined to enact the extent and
speed of change required for sustainability.
Stakeholder anonymity
In the context of normally functioning organizations, anonymity is shunned in favor of
disclosure. However, in the context of altering organizations with the intention of driving them
toward sustainability, anonymity has a new meaning. Our focus in this paper has been on why
stakeholders need to form collectives or fellowships to drive sustainability. A further area of
investigation is characteristics of the collectives that might lead to greater success. One such
characteristic is stakeholder anonymity. Anonymity protects an individual’s identity, reduces
accountability, and conserves reputation. It may be a valuable and rare resource allowing
stakeholders to work together without fear of losing contracts, jobs, or face.
Anonymity might also reduce stakeholders’ likely engagement as they may wish to take
credit for positive changes they have created. For example, a union that negotiates higher salaries
will want credit for it. Take that credit away and they may have less incentive to fight.
Furthermore, working in a group might make stakeholders less likely to want or need to be
anonymous, as there is strength in numbers. The desire to remain anonymous may depend on the
type of action. For example, one may want to take credit for promoting a green initiative, but
remain anonymous about leaking data about a pollution problem.
In this way, anonymity may be useful for stakeholder cooperation. It has been
demonstrated empirically that individuals who are members of anonymous groups solve
problems with more critical ideas and questioning and clarification, and idea recombination;
generate more original solutions and overall communication; experience lower social anxiety and
social desirability and heightened self-esteem, reduced fear of social disapproval, low inhibition,
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and are more likely to participate, communicate, demonstrate objectivity, and make productive
decisions (Connolly, Jessup, and Valacich, 1990; Jessup, Connolly, and Galegher, 1990).
Future research could examine how anonymity affects stakeholder collectives.
Anonymity may improve or hamper the collectives’ influence, or perhaps more likely, the effect
will depend on the particular firm targeted and the stakeholders involved. Future research might
also examine whether all or only some of the stakeholders should be anonymous to improve the
influence of the collective. The idea of anonymity also points to an interesting area of inquiry
into how a successful stakeholder collective disperses credit, or how a failed collective disperses
blame.
Stakeholder legacy
While we have suggested that anonymity may have a significant role in encouraging
sustainability, we also acknowledge the role that legacy may have in influencing behaviour
change. Leaders in society today must make rapid decisions that often have significant and far
reaching effects (Wade-Benzoni, 2008). Further, many people seek to make a positive
contribution to the world they leave behind (de St. Aubin, McAdmans and Kim, 2004; Grant and
Wade-Benzoni, 2009; Wade-Benzoni, Sondak and Galinsky, 2010). They gain a sense of
purpose and derive meaning from their lives when they are able to leave the world a better place
than when they entered it (Grant and Wade-Benzoni, 2009; Wade-Benzoni, 2003). So while
some people may wish to be anonymous, others are very concerned about the legacy they leave
behind.
Stakeholders interested in leaving legacies might find greater success by combining their
efforts; theoretically, the greater the combined talents and effort, the greater the impact and the
greater the legacy. While we specifically discuss the idea of legacy in this section, numerous
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other topics could unite stakeholders such as certain environmental topics/movements (e.g., from
something as broad as protecting our oceans to the more specific saving dolphins from fishing
nets designed to catch tuna), a particular firm-specific occurrence (e.g., GE’s polluting of the
Hudson River), or a particularly harmful product (e.g., CFCs). Future research might examine
the specifics of stakeholder collectives, how they come to unite, and to contrast the idea of
anonymity with legacy.
Other areas for future research
Future research may show how stakeholder groups can work together in order to
maximize the effectiveness of collective action by acting simultaneously or sequentially. It might
be less expensive to a stakeholder group to enter into the collective after others have already
staked their claims. If stakeholder groups have different resources, which generate different
profiles of power, urgency and legitimacy (Mitchell et al. 1997), then in what order should they
deploy them? Should urgency come before legitimacy and legitimacy before power? Is there
some other optimal sequence? Also, at what level should the cooperation be? Should it be global,
local or a mix of both?
We also wonder about a point of diminishing returns, where additional stakeholders
joining the collective begin to hamper the collective’s progress. What is the ideal number of
stakeholders and how does this change depending on internal and external organizational
characteristics? Is there an optimal level of power, urgency and legitimacy that is required and is
of greater importance than the actual number of stakeholder groups involved? For example, in
the right situation, perhaps a collective composed of the government, the media and members of
management would be sufficient to bring an organization to Hart’s (1995) sustainable
development environmental strategy.
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A further avenue for research would be to examine collectives themselves. Are certain
stakeholder groups naturally more cohesive? For example, perhaps internal stakeholders whose
payment is directly tied to firm performance such as managers and employees (and customers
who benefit from low-cost goods) tend to form more cohesive stakeholder collectives than
managers and community members.
Testing our propositions
This paper was limited to theoretical propositions. While quantitative studies with
relatively large sample sizes might be required to test our proposition on the moderating
influence of size, to truly test our propositions and questions for future research, a groundedtheory approach using case studies of successful and unsuccessful stakeholder driven initiatives
is required. Only in this manner could researchers gain enough insight into sustainability
fellowships and their inner workings. Grounded theory approaches might uncover the
mechanisms that are being used by the most successful stakeholder collectives and examine how
failures happened in the case of less successful attempts.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper we asked how can we bring about rapid and comprehensive
organizational sustainability? With species extinction estimated to be 1,000 times greater than
would be the case without human impact (Meadows et al., 2004), and nearly 80 percent of the
world’s fisheries fully to over-exploited, depleted, or in a state of collapse (Garcia and Cochrane,
2011), we still continue to operate businesses based on economic models of continuous and
unrelenting growth. Possibly, the answer lies in fellowships, not just of stakeholders but also in
motivations (combining moral and instrumental arguments).
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The inscription on the Ring in Tolkien’s (1954) masterpiece reads: “One Ring to rule
them all, one Ring to find them, one Ring to bring them all and in the darkness bind them”. Our
reoccurring analogy has been to compare the one ring to the idea of limitless economic progress
and growth. While many of us have benefited immensely from this progress and growth, today it
seems to be creating more harm than good. It is difficult to tell if our ring of progress and growth
at all costs ultimately corrupts just like Tolkien’s ring, but what is clear is that together we must
forge a new ring, a ring of sustainability, and it is this ring that will bind us all on the path toward
truly sustainable business practices.
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